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“Whatever you do for me but without me, you 
do against me”
—Youth of Kazakhstan1
Governance and accountability are central to 
Africa’s development goals. In particular, the 
continent’s focus on sustained and inclusive 
economic growth and poverty reduction can-
not be achieved without addressing gover-
nance. Poverty in Africa is partly attributable 
to waste, corruption, lack of transparency 
and inefficiency in the delivery of social ser-
vices. More than 40% of the population of 
Sub- Saharan Africa is poor—that is, living on 
less than USD1.25 a day.2 Only 5 of 54 Afri-
can countries scored above 50 in Transpar-
ency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index in 2012.3
Building human capital development sys-
tems centered on communities—with a focus 
on empowering the poor, especially poor 
women—is the key to increasing economic 
growth, overcoming poverty and achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals. Well-
skilled and healthy people can contribute to 
more rapid and sustained growth in Africa, 
and programs focused on developing human 
capital would allow the poor to escape from 
poverty. Governance interventions focused 
on social service delivery are needed to 
achieve these multiple goals.
This chapter outlines the pivotal role of 
governance for improved social service deliv-
ery, more robust human capital and more 
inclusive and sustained growth in Africa. It 
contends that, to enhance governance, bet-
ter mechanisms are needed to strengthen 
value for money, voice and accountability, 
transparency and greater citizen participa-
tion in service delivery. The main principle of 
improving governance and accountability is 
to put the poor at the center of service deliv-
ery, which would ensure that services pro-
vided are relevant, equitably distributed and 
of good quality.
The chapter is organized as follows. The 
first section defines “governance” and estab-
lishes its importance for human capital devel-
opment. It shows that ideas of who should 
govern have evolved over time and points to 
the merits of a more decentralized model for 
improved human development outcomes. 
The second section examines the charac-
teristics of governance and accountability 
in service delivery in Africa today. It demon-
strates that overcentralized and weak gov-
ernance systems have allowed waste, low 
value for money, poor management practices 
and regressive policies to continue unabated. 
Third, it highlights the steps that some Afri-
can governments have taken to improve their 
governance systems, while the fourth sec-
tion suggests actions and policies that can 
enhance the relevance, quality and equity 
of social service provision by strengthening 
governance and accountability. The chapter 
concludes by summarizing its findings and 
considering the merits of “new public gover-
nance” as a step toward overcoming some 
of the problems of service delivery in Africa 
today.
What is “new public governance,” 
and why is it important for human 
capital development?
“Governance” is a popular but imprecise 
term that has evolved in relation to chang-
ing ideas about the scope of government 
and who holds—or should hold—political 
power. It refers to the institutional arrange-
ments and processes by which political deci-
sions are reached or put into practice. Once 
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a synonym for “government,” “governance” 
has now come to mean the opposite—that 
is, “governing without government.”4 Since 
1980 “governance” has taken on at least six 
distinct meanings for public service provision: 
(1) “good governance,” where public affairs 
are managed according to the principles of 
efficiency, accountability, participation, trans-
parency, equity and rule of law; (2) economic 
governance, referring to the institutional envi-
ronment within which the economy functions, 
including the formal and informal rules and 
regulations that govern economic transac-
tions and determine access to markets and 
public services; (3) corporate governance, 
referring to the structures and processes by 
which organizations delivering public services 
are directed, controlled and held to account; 
(4) new public management, where private 
sector management methods—in particular, 
a focus on the “customer” and an emphasis 
on outputs, value for money, performance 
standards and measures, and consumer 
choice—are applied in public service delivery; 
(5) public–private partnerships, where mar-
kets and quasimarkets play a role in deliver-
ing public services; and (6) policy networks, 
where powerful coalitions comprising a vari-
ety of state and nonstate actors regulate and 
coordinate public policy and service deliv-
ery.5 “Governance” thus refers to institutional 
arrangements and principles on how power 
should be exercised at both the state and 
market levels, with responsibility and ethics 
at the center (1–4 above), as well as political 
processes involving nonstate actors (5–6).
The movement from “government” to 
“governance” reflects an ideological shift from 
viewing state actors as the sole and legiti-
mate source of political authority in a country, 
toward seeing the benefits of more partici-
patory and diffuse power-sharing arrange-
ments. The core idea here is that modern 
states should be responsive to the needs and 
preferences of citizens. The public adminis-
tration literature thus documents a transition 
from traditional public administration to “new 
public management” and then to “new public 
governance” (table 28.1). What we see as we 
move down the table is a diffusion of political 
power based on the notion that neither states 
nor markets can be trusted to faithfully act in 
the collective social interest. In most coun-
tries the move toward promoting the private 
sector and privatization in social service deliv-
ery occurred in response to systematic prob-
lems in state provision linked to rent seeking, 
inefficient resource allocation, poor quality 
outputs, low performance, limited respon-
siveness and weak accountability.6 Similarly, 
markets can be viewed either positively as 
efficient resource-allocating mechanisms or 
Public 
administration 
paradigm
Institutional 
manifestation
Who has 
power
Basis of political 
authority
Nature of 
power
Source of 
legitimacy
Main contribution 
to policy process
Policy focus in 
service delivery
Accountability 
mechanisms
Traditional public 
administration
The state as sole 
policy authority
Government 
officials
State-centered Unitary State as “the 
epitome of the 
collective interest” 
(Pierre and Peters 
2000, 15)
Authority (legal 
framework)
Policy 
implementation
Top-down: “Good 
governance”
Bottom-up: Voice/
removal from office
New public 
management
Private–public 
partnerships
Government 
officials and 
market players
Market-based Devolved Markets as “the 
most efficient 
and just allocative 
mechanism 
available” (Pierre 
and Peters 2000, 
19)
Economy and 
efficiency (value for 
money)
Service inputs 
and outputs
Top-down: Compact/
corporate governance
Bottom-up: Consumer 
choice/client power
New public 
governance
Policy networks Government, 
market and civil 
society actors 
(any combination 
of these groups)
People-centered Plural and 
pluralistic
Citizens as the 
only ones who 
can ensure that 
their interests are 
represented and 
secured
Effectiveness 
(accountability)
Service 
processes and 
outcomes
Top-down: 
Constitutional and 
legal framework/
preference shaping 
(Dunleavy 1991)
Bottom-up: Wider 
citizen consultation 
mechanisms
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Osborne (2006), Skogstad (2003), Pierre and Peters (2000), and Dunleavy (1991).
Table 28.1 From traditional public administration to new public governance
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negatively as arenas where self-interested 
actors pursue their narrow personal goals 
at the expense of the broader social wel-
fare.7 New public governance reflects an 
increasingly popular view that the best way to 
ensure citizens’ welfare is to involve them in 
the design, implementation and evaluation of 
public service delivery.
The transition from traditional public 
administration to new public governance rep-
resents an important step toward maximizing 
human development outcomes. In the new 
public governance model, multiple interdepen-
dent actors—including citizens—participate in 
policy decisions and contribute to the delivery 
of public services, leading to more effective 
policy outcomes. Participation by a plurality 
of actors both increases the level of exper-
tise available in policy circles and enables the 
articulation of a wider range of interests. By 
putting people at the center of policymaking, 
new public governance ensures that policy 
decisions are more responsive to local needs 
and demands and that there is a greater focus 
on quality and equity in social service provi-
sion. In addition, because the model is based 
on deep decentralization, there is a greater 
chance of achieving synergy in interventions 
across social sectors.8 Finally, it should be 
noted that the state is not replaced in the new 
public governance model: rather, civil society 
becomes a key partner of the state alongside 
the private sector, and any combination of 
these three sets of actors may be in force for 
any given policy area.
In an ideal governance system, power is 
tempered by accountability and those who 
hold power are held responsible for both their 
actions and the outcomes of their actions. Yet 
in some systems (even democratic ones), this 
does not happen. This is because people lack 
information, competence or will to hold those 
in power accountable,9 and people in power 
are not held accountable through institutional 
mechanisms and processes. These shortcom-
ings can be resolved by increasing transpar-
ency, which allows easy access to information; 
building peoples’ skills and capabilities, so that 
they are better able to process the information 
they receive; activating peoples’ voice, so that 
they feel empowered to act on the information 
they have processed; and strengthening insti-
tutional mechanisms, so that there are systems 
of checks and balances, as well as positive or 
negative incentives inducing power-holders 
to behave in an accountable and responsive 
manner. Positive incentives can include perfor-
mance-related bonuses, commendations for 
doing a good job or retention of political office 
because of continued citizen confidence. Neg-
ative incentives can include legal redress, pub-
lic censure, abandonment by citizens or clients 
or removal from power.
In an ideal service delivery system, there 
are built-in mechanisms enabling the users of 
services to hold those providing the services 
accountable. This can be better understood 
by examining the relationship between the 
three key stakeholders in the service deliv-
ery process: citizens/clients, service provid-
ers and politicians/policymakers (figure 28.1). 
Service users may pursue a “long route of 
accountability,” whereby in their role as citi-
zens they hold those in power (politicians and 
policymakers) responsible for putting in place 
institutional mechanisms (or “compacts”) that 
induce service providers to deliver sufficient, 
relevant and high-quality outputs.10 However, 
problems can occur in this circular relation-
ship: policymakers may lack the competence, 
information or will to hold service providers 
fully accountable; or citizens’ influence (or 
“voice”) may be weak, as is often the case for 
poor people or in nondemocratic contexts. A 
much more straightforward and “short route 
to accountability” would be to empower ser-
vice users in their role as clients to directly hold 
service providers accountable for the quantity, 
quality and relevance of their outputs. This 
could be done by increasing the level of com-
petition among service providers, so that they 
have an incentive to perform better; enabling 
citizens to monitor and discipline service pro-
viders; or strengthening service users’ role in 
policymaking by moving toward a new pub-
lic governance approach to service delivery. 
In this way, “client power” is enhanced, and 
service users are transformed from passive 
service recipients to active and mobilized par-
ticipant-members in the process.11
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Where accountability channels in service 
delivery are weak, basic services provided 
may be insufficient, irrelevant, inequitably 
distributed or of low quality. Any of these 
attributes would result in suboptimal human 
development outcomes. Moreover, other 
problems could arise, such as the capture 
of the benefits of government spending or 
service provision by a small set of actors at 
the expense of the many. In such situations 
the biggest losers will most likely be the poor 
or other vulnerable groups with weaker eco-
nomic and social influence.
Strengthening governance and account-
ability in service delivery is thus very impor-
tant for human capital development. Tying 
power to responsibility ensures not only that 
services are delivered but also that the ser-
vices delivered are relevant, equitably distrib-
uted and of good quality. The main principle 
for improving governance and accountabil-
ity is to put the poor at the center of service 
delivery.
What characterizes governance 
and accountability in service 
delivery in Africa?
Insufficiently decentralized administrations
Most African countries continue to deliver 
social services based on a centralized top-
down model consistent with the traditional 
public administration model identified in table 
28.1. Service delivery is performed mainly 
by public providers, and central government 
ministries retain responsibility for spending 
and resource-allocation decisions, rather 
than devolving these functions to regional, 
local or private providers. Education in most 
countries is mainly state provided, and across 
Sub- Saharan countries public facilities pro-
vide two-thirds of all health care.12 In addi-
tion, centralized bureaucratic planning often 
means that policymakers become intensely 
involved in operational details and concen-
trate more on inputs than on outcomes and 
impact.
Where there is decentralization, it is mostly 
based on a “devolution of power and restric-
tion of budget” approach. Therefore it tends 
to have the following constraints: weak capac-
ities of local administrators, to whom man-
agement and finance functions have been 
devolved; no formal reporting mechanisms or 
information requirements; no specific perfor-
mance requirements; lack of accountability of 
local-level civil servants either to their vertical 
line ministries or to local leaders in charge of 
basic social services; low representation of 
civil society through capable institutions at the 
local level; and lack of synergy between inter-
ventions across social sectors. Because the 
voice and authority of line ministries continue 
to prevail on local institutions, there are often 
Figure 28.1 Key relationships of accountability in service delivery
Source: World Bank 2004.
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imbalances in resource allocations—which 
seems to be the case looking at the differ-
ences in spending and outcomes in the health 
and education sectors in Senegal and Tanza-
nia (table 28.2 below).
The main inefficiencies in service delivery 
are closely linked to failures from overcentral-
ized bureaucratic structures. These include 
inadequate and inefficient resource allocation 
and financing options; inadequate domestic 
production of and access to commodities; 
inappropriate procurement and management 
of equipment and commodities; inappropri-
ate staff mix; lack of performance incentives; 
and weak participatory and accountability 
mechanisms.
Inappropriate, outdated 
and weak regulation
Regardless of strong centralization, in many 
African countries government regulations for 
standards of service delivery are inappropri-
ate or outdated, and enforcement is weak. 
This creates a lack of motivation and account-
ability for local civil servants and causes 
technical deficiencies and leakages of public 
resources. Due to weak clinical governance, 
the quality of care in African hospitals is gen-
erally low. In addition, the lack of hospital 
accreditation and weak enforcement of regu-
lations and clinical standards has resulted in 
the poor quality of care. Due to poor regu-
lation in the pharmaceutical industry, a third 
of medicines in developing countries, notably 
Africa, are counterfeit and may be damag-
ing health, rather than contributing to better 
health outcomes.13 Resources do not reach 
the frontline, often because of corruption, 
and there is inefficient and ineffective invest-
ment of the public budget. Across African 
countries there are indications of “leakages,” 
where funds allocated to particular services 
do not reach the intended end-user. In Chad 
99% of funds allocated never reached local 
health centers, and in Kenya more than 80% 
of schools did not receive the full bursaries 
to which they were entitled.14 Given the lack 
of accountability to government and citizens, 
service providers have a large degree of lati-
tude to follow their own agendas.15 Moreover, 
policymakers have difficulty enforcing imple-
mentation of their policies and regulations 
down the chain of command.
Lack of control features and performance 
incentives lead to inefficiencies in educa-
tion and health spending, though outcomes 
vary across African countries. Salaries are 
the highest-cost items in education and 
health provision: in some countries, such as 
Ghana and Malawi, teachers’ wages make 
up more than 90% of primary education 
costs.16 Yet in many countries a high percent-
age of teachers and health workers do not 
show up to work (figure 28.2). Absenteeism 
among teachers ranges from 8% in Kenya 
to 35% Namibia, while absenteeism among 
health workers ranges from 3% in Uganda 
to 19% in Mozambique. Improved learning 
and health outcomes can only be achieved 
when service delivery providers (teachers, 
doctors) are actually serving users. The rea-
sons for absenteeism vary across countries, 
Figure 28.2 Teacher and health worker absenteeism rates, selected African countries
Source: PETS/QSDS Data Portal (http://pets.prognoz.com).
Provider absence rate in education (%) Provider absence rate in health (%)
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but civil service norms of guaranteed employ-
ment and salaries unrelated to merit or per-
formance in many countries enable poor 
attendance.17 The absence of incentives 
often makes it impossible to attract and retain 
qualified and knowledgeable civil servants in 
the social sectors, or to provide them with the 
necessary skills and support.
Low value for money
African governments dedicate a large share 
of their total spending to social services. 
Between 37% (Uganda) and 63% (Ethiopia) 
of total government expenditures in Africa are 
allocated to social services areas.18 On aver-
age, African countries spend 7.2% of GDP on 
primary and secondary education and 6.5% 
on health—higher than any other region in 
the developing world (figures 28.3 and 28.4). 
Social protection measures also consume a 
large proportion of resources, notably in North 
Africa: in 2008 food and fuel subsidies consti-
tuted 31% of current government spending in 
Egypt, 20% in Morocco and 18% in Tunisia.19
Figure 28.4 Health expenditures as a % of GDP by region, 2000 and 2009
Source: WHO 2012.
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Yet high spending has not generally trans-
lated into productive or effective outcomes. 
There is a weak link between resources allo-
cated to social services and outcomes of 
social provision in most African countries—a 
problem partly attributable to weak gover-
nance and poor accountability. For exam-
ple, the decline in under-five mortality has 
been slower in Africa than in other devel-
oping regions (figure 28.5). In Sierra Leone 
the government spends 18.8% of GDP on 
health, yet the country has one of the world’s 
highest rates of child and maternal mortality, 
and national assessments by health work-
ers indicate that the overall health situation 
is worsening.20 In some countries social wel-
fare remains low: nearly 50% of Kenyans live 
in poverty and more than 40% lack sufficient 
food.21
The reasons for poor outcomes differ 
across countries. While in most African coun-
tries the number of students with access to 
primary education has grown over the past 
10 years (figure 28.6), the quality of education 
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Figure 28.6 Africa’s progress toward MDG 2: universal primary education
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics data.
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is not often globally competitive. For exam-
ple, in international comparisons of student 
achievement, such as the Trends in Inter-
national Mathematics and Science Study, 
African students have generally performed 
worse than non-African students.22 In some 
cases it is not so much the quality as the 
relevance of the services that presents a 
problem. Skills mismatches between the out-
puts of education and the skills that employ-
ers demand have contributed to high youth 
unemployment and underemployment, even 
among those who have reached higher levels 
of education. A quarter of tertiary-educated 
young adults in Cameroon are unemployed 
(figure 28.7).
In 2010 a set of metrics on the perfor-
mance of African schools and health clinics —
referred to as Service Delivery Indicators—
was piloted in Senegal and Tanzania, which 
demonstrated the reasons for African coun-
tries’ poor performance in education and 
health (table 28.2). In Tanzania staff absen-
teeism is high, with around a quarter of all 
teachers missing on the survey day. More-
over, fewer than half of all teachers possess 
the minimum basic knowledge required to 
teach their subject, students spend only two 
hours a day at school and learning materi-
als are in such short supply that there is less 
than one textbook per student. Given these 
constraints, it is hardly surprising that learning 
outcomes in Tanzania are poor. In Senegal 
only two in five health clinics have access 
to electricity, water and sanitation facilities, 
and only half have access to the three basic 
pieces of equipment (thermometer, stetho-
scope and weighing scale). In Senegal 22% of 
clinics were out of stock of the drugs consid-
ered essential, and one in five health workers 
was absent during the random spot check. 
Perhaps inevitably diagnoses are accurate in 
only a third of all cases and health outcomes 
remain poor.
Weak capacity and poor management
Lack of public management capacities and 
other key skills is one factor affecting the 
performance of social service delivery at all 
levels. Availability of competent managers, 
policies and procedures, quality-improve-
ment systems, costing and a cost-analysis 
culture, financial management as well as 
human resources management are not high 
on the agenda in health or education. Admin-
istration functions are mainly held by techni-
cal staff (teachers and doctors), who lack the 
basic training and information necessary to 
monitor, plan, identify and solve problems.23 
For example, most staff members do not 
Figure 28.7 Unemployment rate among tertiary-educated people ages 25–34
Source: Mauritania Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire; Cape Verde Education Country Status Report 2011; 
Cameroon Employment and Informal Sector Survey; Benin Integrated Survey on Household Living Conditions; and 
Rwanda Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey.
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have the skills to interpret and use data for 
decisionmaking, particularly at lower levels. 
At higher levels, policymakers and social ser-
vices planners do not always have the man-
agement, analytical or communication skills 
for policy formulation and implementation.
Failures in forward planning have also 
affected service delivery outcomes. Across 
Africa there is a shortage of qualified health 
workers and teachers, with the problem stem-
ming partly from past investment shortfalls in 
preservice training and weak human resource 
management.24 Sub- Saharan Africa on aver-
age has two doctors and 11 nurses/midwives 
per 10,000 people—compared with 19 doc-
tors and 49 nurses/midwives in the Ameri-
cas, and 32 doctors and 78 nurses/midwives 
in Europe.25 According to some estimates, 
the African health workforce would need to 
expand by around 140% to achieve enough 
coverage to have a positive impact on health 
and life expectancy in their countries.26 In 
some countries low domestic production has 
resulted in shortages in medical supplies; in 
other cases poor supply chain management 
has resulted in drug shortages. In Malawi 
drug shortages have reached critical levels, 
with only 9% of health facilities (54 of 585) 
Senegal Tanzania
Education
At the school
Infrastructurea 0.17 0.03
Children per classroom 34.23 74.05
Average number of students per teacher 28.74 48.71
Textbooks per student 2.55 0.94
Teachers
Absence rate 0.18 0.23
Time children are in school being taught (minutes) 195 124
Share of teachers with minimum knowledge 0.52 0.42
Funding
Education expenditure reaching primary schoolsb 153.59 124.54
Delays in salariesc 0.002 0.020
Health
At the clinic
Infrastructurea 0.39 0.19
Medical equipment per clinicd 0.53 0.78
Stock out of drugse 0.22 0.24
Medical personnel
Absence rate 0.20 0.21
Diagnostic accuracy in outpatient consultationsf 0.34 0.57
Time spent counseling patients per clinician (minutes) 39 29
Funding
Health expenditure reaching primary clinicsg 1.78 7.01
Delays in salariesc 0.05 0.02
a. Percentage of facilities with electricity, water and sanitation.
b. Education expenditure reaching primary schools per primary school age student (purchasing power parity USD).
c. Proportion of employees whose salary has been overdue for more than two months.
d. Health facility’s access to all three basic pieces of equipment (thermometer, stethoscope and weighing scale) (=1), or 
lack of one or more of them (=0).
e. Percentage of 15 basic drugs that during the survey were experiencing stock-out in the facility.
f. Average score 1 if correct diagnosis is reached, 0 otherwise, during patient case simulations.
g. Primary health expenditure reaching primary clinics per capita (purchasing power parity USD).
Source: Bold and others 2011.
Table 28.2 Summary results for Service Delivery Indicators pilot survey, 2010
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possessing the full Essential Health Package 
list of drugs for treating common diseases.27
Poor allocation of resources 
and targeting of benefits
Poor planning and management mean that 
resource allocations often do not follow a 
logical pattern. In education the allocation 
of teachers largely reflects the distribution 
of public expenditures, since salaries are a 
major component of spending. In a consis-
tent and fair system, the number of teachers 
available to a school should be higher when 
the number of students is larger. From a 
statistical point of view, this implies that the 
coefficient of determination that reflects the 
relationship between the number of students 
and the number of teachers should be close 
to 100%. In reality, however, this statistic var-
ies from one country to another (figure 28.8). 
More than half of the countries in figure 28.8 
have a coefficient below 70%. In Benin it is 
48%, in Ghana 46% and in South Sudan 
only 21%. In Togo, for public schools with 
200 pupils, the number of teachers varies 
between 2 and 16. Given that people are the 
main resource in social sectors, their equita-
ble distribution among units of production is 
an important aspect of governance.
Additionally, within countries, resources 
are often unevenly distributed and not care-
fully targeted, so that those most in need of 
government assistance—the poor—do not 
receive the greatest benefits of social ser-
vice provision. The wealthiest tend to capture 
the bulk of public social spending benefits, 
because governments allocate the greatest 
resources to the areas where the rich live 
(for example, urban centers) or to the sec-
tors that they use the most (for example, ter-
tiary education or specialized health care). 
In Guinea 48% of public spending on health 
goes to the richest quintile, and only 4% trick-
les down to the poorest quintile.28 In Mada-
gascar the poorest quintile receives only 8% 
of the education budget, the richest quintile 
receives 41%.29 In Egypt nonpoor consumers 
receive 80% of the value of government food 
subsidies, and 93% of the benefits of state- 
subsidized gasoline go to the richest quin-
tile.30 Inequities in service delivery have led to 
widening income inequalities and contributed 
to intergenerational poverty. Many of the poor 
are women or single mothers.
Weak citizen voice and low transparency
In most African countries, service users (the 
citizens/clients shown in figure 28.1) have 
weak voice and no strong instrument to influ-
ence the allocation of resources or the plan-
ning and implementation of social service 
delivery. They are not involved in some or all 
of policy formulation, planning, implementa-
tion or monitoring of budget use and quality 
of services. Hence accountability by service 
providers to either communities or technical 
Figure 28.8 Determination coefficient (%) of the relationship between number of pupils and 
number of teachers in public primary schools in Africa, various years (2006–2011)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Pôle de Dakar (www.poledakar.org/index.php/en).
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ministries is very weak. Moreover, ordinary 
citizens often lack experience in negotiating 
or consulting with public institutions on ser-
vice quality, which contributes to their insti-
tutionalized passive behavior on poor per-
formance in service delivery. The fact that 
citizens do not generally have the capacity 
to hold their administrations and service pro-
viders accountable for inefficient social ser-
vice delivery leads to exclusion of marginal-
ized communities that have weak citizen and 
civil society organization capacity to demand 
accountability. This issue is particularly critical 
in fragile states where the rule of law is gener-
ally poor.
Most service users also have inadequate 
awareness of their rights or a poor capacity 
to ask for and exercise their rights. The com-
mon way to express citizen’s voice is through 
local or national elections in countries where 
democracy is just emerging. Once elected, 
leaders are so overwhelmed by various urgent 
and competing priorities that they neglect 
pro-poor social services. Since the poor have 
few prospects to strongly express their voice, 
civil servants are not held accountable for 
effective delivery of basic social services. In 
addition, most service users lack the experi-
ence to negotiate or consult with public insti-
tutions. This contributes to passive behavior, 
poor service quality and weak accountability 
by service providers to communities.
Moreover, weak information reporting 
requirements in many countries mean that 
there are low (or no) flows of information from 
service providers to either beneficiaries or 
financiers. Communication infrastructures 
and information systems are weak in most 
countries, and private data are poorly cap-
tured, despite legal requirements. Thus there 
is little information exchange between the 
private and public sectors in most countries, 
and policymakers have difficulty in enforcing 
implementation of their policies and regu-
lations down the chain of command.31 This 
communication deficiency among central 
government, local authorities and citizens 
hurts the provision of basic social services to 
disadvantaged groups. These issues could 
be overcome if governments made use of 
tools such as citizen report cards or com-
munity score cards (see below), established 
community consultation mechanisms or 
included communities on social services gov-
erning boards.
Lack of information on service delivery 
performance provides citizens with little lever-
age for applying pressure on governments or 
service providers to improve performance. 
In most African countries there is little robust 
data on the quality of service delivery, which 
is critical for holding providers accountable 
for service delivery. Budget allocations alone 
have proven to be weak indicators of the 
quality of services. Furthermore, depending 
on the public sector to address service deliv-
ery failures may not be realistic.
What have African countries 
done to improve governance and 
accountability?
Some African countries have taken steps to 
collate and make available information on 
social services provision, and in some cases 
this has led to improved governance systems. 
Information matters: it clarifies issues for 
people wishing to hold service providers and 
governments accountable, and it elucidates 
problems that agencies committed to reform 
will take steps to resolve. With data, the case 
to demand good governance becomes eas-
ier to make. For example, the Service Deliv-
ery Indicators (see above) allow for a broad 
understanding of the quality of services being 
provided and for results to be compared 
across countries.
More than 30% of African countries have 
implemented diagnostic public expenditure 
tracking surveys (PETSs) to better under-
stand the apparently weak link between 
resource allocations and outcomes (table 
28.3). PETSs provide an indication of leak-
ages in funding by tracing the path between 
central government allocation and receipt by 
social service providers. By collecting and 
disseminating data highlighting at what point 
funds go missing, PETSs empower citizens/
clients and strengthen accountability in social 
services provision (box 28.1). Sometimes the 
information that emerges from PETSs reveals 
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why government spending does not achieve 
expected outcomes: a PETS in education 
carried out in Zambia in 2002 showed that 
increased government spending on educa-
tion had little effect on outcomes, because 
parents reduced their private spending on 
education by an equivalent amount.32 How-
ever, PETSs may not be able to be imple-
mented in all settings: in Mozambique the 
complexity of financing and logistical systems 
in the health sector rendered estimation of 
leakages during its 2002 PETS difficult and 
led to the conclusion that lack of government 
control provided little incentive against fraud 
and corruption.33
Staff absence surveys have also served 
as a powerful tool for highlighting deficien-
cies in the quality of public sector service 
Country Education Leakage Health Leakage
Cameroon 2004 No firm estimates 2003 No firm estimates
Chad — 2004 73% nonwage
99% local allocation
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2007 No firm estimates —
Ghana 2000 50% nonwage
20% salary
2000 80% nonwage
20% salary
Kenya 2004 36% of bursary funds 2004 38% health center level
25% user fees at facility level
37% community development funds at 
facility level
Madagascar 2003
2006
9% of cash contributions 2003
2006
No firm estimates
15% petroleum and registers sent
Mali 2005 60–90% allocated textbooks 2006 No firm estimates
Mozambique — 2002 No firm estimates
Namibia 2003 No proof 2003 No proof
Niger 2008 No firm estimates 2008 No firm estimates
Nigeria — 2002 No firm estimates
Rwanda 2000
2004
No firm estimates 2000 No firm estimates
Senegal — 2002 No firm estimates
Sierra Leone 2001 No firm estimates 2001 No firm estimates
Tanzania 1999
2001
2004
57% overall
18% nonwage
5%
1999
2001
41%
18% nonwage
Uganda 1996
2002
87% on average
18%
1996
2000
Not defined
Zambia 2002 10% fixed-rule grants
76% nonwage
2007 No firm estimates
Note: — denotes that no PETS was carried out. “No firm estimates” means that a PETS was carried out but there were 
no percentage estimates of the level of leakages.
Source: PETS/QSDS Data Portal (http://pets.prognoz.com).
Table 28.3 Summary table of PETS carried out in education and health sectors across Africa
In 1996 Uganda was the first country to carry out a 
PETS focused on its education sector to see how 
much of funding reached intended end-users. The 
survey showed that, between 1991 and 1995, only 
13% of all funding and 22% of nonwage funding 
reached schools. The remaining 87% was leaked 
at the district official level and went to purposes 
unrelated to education. Following these results, 
the government launched a publicity campaign to 
inform citizens of how much money was actually 
being spent on education. Monthly intergovernmen-
tal transfers of funds were made public knowledge 
through newspapers. This action went a long way to 
decreasing the leakages in education funding from 
78% to 20%, as evidenced in the follow-up PETS 
conducted in 2002.
Source: Reinikka and Smith 2004.
Box 28.1 Reducing leakages in educational funding through a PETS in Uganda
Chapter 28 Strengthening governance and accountability
439
provision. By providing information on how 
many service providers (teachers, doctors, 
nurses) do not show up to work when they 
are supposed to be on duty allows for mea-
sures to be taken to counter absenteeism.34 
The data in figure 28.2 indicate that Uganda 
was able to reduce absenteeism in the health 
sector from 37% in 1996 to just 3% in 2000.35
Citizen report cards (CRCs) and com-
munity score cards (CSCs) are also powerful 
tools in promoting transparency and public 
accountability. CRCs and CSCs gauge the 
quality and performance of public services, 
and the results of these surveys are normally 
made available to the public. However, there 
is little evidence of their widespread use 
across African countries. Some of the coun-
tries that have documented their use include 
the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. How-
ever, in 2011/12 the Transparency Account-
ability Program of the Results for Develop-
ment Institute issued requests for proposals 
from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
to design and implement CRCs and CSCs in 
the health and education sectors in Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania and Uganda—so these tools are 
gaining ground. Evidence from the Gambia 
shows how CSCs allowed for greater client 
power in decisionmaking, including a new 
public governance approach to policymaking 
in the health sector (box 28.2). Implementa-
tion of CRCs in Uganda led to improvements 
in both the quantity and quality of primary 
health care in Uganda (box 28.3).
Ethiopia and Senegal have launched sev-
eral programs with the technical and finan-
cial support of bilateral donors’ agencies to 
try and improve the quality of health care. 
Although none of these programs is specific 
to the issue of quality of care in the hospitals, 
they all have been implemented in hospitals 
and have shown that it is possible to improve 
results. A project in Ethiopia mobilized hospi-
tal management teams to enhance the per-
formance of the hospital.36 A similar approach 
has been undertaken in Senegal to develop 
quality awareness at the level of management 
teams.37 These examples demonstrate that 
quality improvement is possible in hospitals.
Tunisia has recently addressed defi-
ciencies in the outputs and outcomes of 
its education system—particularly the low 
quality and relevance of its offerings, which 
have contributed to difficult education-to- 
employment transitions and high graduate 
unemployment—by creating a Quality Assur-
ance and Accreditation Authority (QAAA) (box 
28.4). The QAAA has only recently become 
functional, so it is too early to report results 
on its effectiveness. However, it is expected 
to greatly boost the quality of higher educa-
tion in the country, thereby tackling one of 
the main sources of youth unemployment, 
which was a main cause of the Arab Spring 
in 2010–2011.
Ethiopia’s Protection of Basic Services 
program has substantially improved the 
access to and quality of basic service delivery 
through an institutionalized system for trans-
parency, accountability and community voice 
In the Gambia CSCs found that teachers received 
more than 70% approval ratings across regions, while 
school facilities such as furniture, core textbooks and 
toilets ranked below 40%. These results led to lobby-
ing by parents and school administrations to the Min-
istry of Education for the timely and adequate supply 
of teaching materials and equipment, as well as the 
establishment of a reward program to attract and re-
tain qualified teachers.
In the health sector, the survey indicated less 
than 30% satisfaction with staff capacity and 
less than 15% satisfaction with the availability of 
essential health equipment. It was recommended 
that a health committee including community rep-
resentatives be established for increased voice and 
accountability, through immediate feedback and 
mutually developed action plans. The CSC process 
also revitalized the self-help spirit among commu-
nities with individuals making voluntary financial 
contributions, and the emphasis on community 
roles in addressing problems with facilities in the 
community.
Source: Dedu and Kajubi 2005.
Box 28.2 Increasing client power through use of CSCs in the Gambia
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Experimental design. Uganda was the site of a ran-
domized field experiment, where 50 rural communi-
ties were selected for intervention (treatment areas) 
and then compared against nonselected commu-
nities (control group). Surveys (or CRCs) were con-
ducted to collect baseline information on health 
service provision: 50 service providers and 5,000 
households were surveyed separately. The report 
card results were then disseminated to the two sur-
vey groups in three stages. During the first stage 
trained local health NGO workers organized com-
munity meetings to report results, provide informa-
tion on patient rights and assist in the drawing up an 
action plan to address community concerns. During 
the second stage the same NGO representatives re-
ported results to health staff. The third stage was an 
interface meeting between community groups and 
health workers; a shared action plan was drawn up 
outlining steps to be taken by whom and within what 
time frame. The community contract was strength-
ened by measures to enable monitoring by citizens. 
At the end of one year the same respondent pool 
was re-surveyed to measure the impact of the CRC 
scheme.
Outcomes. Treatment area facilities showed marked 
improvement over control group facilities in the fol-
lowing ways.
Facilities saw an increase in quantity and quality 
of primary health care:
• 20% expansion in the utilisation of general outpa-
tient services.
• 33% reduction in under-five mortality.
• 0.14 z-score increase in infant weight.
• Significant increase in child immunizations.
Additionally, there was an improvement in staff 
behavior and treatment practices:
• Absenteeism fell by 13 percentage points.
• Waiting times were 12 minutes lower than in con-
trol group facilities.
• Fewer drugs were leaked.
• Treatment group facilities were better maintained.
Cost. At a cost of only USD3 per household, or 
USD160,000 overall, the CRC scheme signified high 
value for money. The main expense related to collect-
ing data for the report cards.
Source: Bjorkman and Svensson 2009.
Box 28.3 Improving health outcomes through use of CRCs in Uganda
Context. Over the past decade Tunisia has experi-
enced deterioration in the quality and effectiveness 
of higher education, with high leakages of funds 
and unprecedented graduate unemployment, which 
reached 33% in 2012. Apart from a poorly perform-
ing economy, factors contributing to this situation 
include a dramatic increase in student flows, insuf-
ficient number of consistent investment plans for in-
frastructure and equipment, degradation of teaching 
and learning conditions, and the absence of a qual-
ity monitoring system at process and product levels. 
Indeed, lack of accountability and performance audit 
mechanisms inevitably leads to poor quality and inef-
ficient outcomes.
Major issues and challenges. An analysis of the de-
terminants of quality education highlights the need for 
setting minimal performance standards in education 
and improving the definition of curricula. The absence 
of quality assurance hampers the professional mobil-
ity of graduates and thus limits regional integration 
prospects for the mutual professional recognition of 
diplomas and degrees. This jeopardizes youth em-
ployability in the long run.
Quality Assurance and Accreditation Authority. To ad-
dress these challenges, in 2008 Tunisia passed a law 
to create a National Authority for Evaluation, Quality 
Assurance and Accreditation in higher education. 
The Quality Assurance and Accreditation Authority 
(QAAA) became functional in 2012. Its mission is to 
ensure better higher education and to enhance excel-
lence among universities. Specifically, the QAAA will 
assess university curricula and learning outcomes, 
as well as graduates’ employability and creativeness; 
promote quality assurance; and conduct accredita-
tion through certifying public and private higher edu-
cation institutions to ensure that academic and ad-
ministrative services are provided in accordance with 
standards. The QAAA is expected to greatly boost 
the quality of higher education institutions by making 
them more accountable for the quality of their outputs 
in line with citizen expectations and the needs of the 
labor market.
Box 28.4 Improving higher education outcomes through quality assurance mechanisms 
in Tunisia
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(box 28.5). Civic engagement in the country 
has been strengthened through participatory 
budgeting, citizen monitoring of public service 
delivery and grievance redress mechanisms.
In sum, the measures that African coun-
tries have implemented to improve gover-
nance and accountability are laudable, and it 
appears that some governments have made 
headway in improving their social services 
governance systems. But as the foregoing 
discussion shows, only a few countries have 
taken steps to empower citizens’ roles in ser-
vice delivery—so there is more work to be 
done. The next section highlights measures 
that can improve governance and account-
ability and thus lead to more relevant, higher 
quality and more equitable service delivery 
outcomes.
What future actions and policies 
can lead to better governance and 
accountability in service delivery?
Across Africa, peoples’ welfare has been 
threatened by poor health and education 
outcomes and limited access to social pro-
tection. Often this is not because of a lack 
of commitment to these goals, but rather 
because of inefficiencies, weak oversight and 
low standards of performance. Demand-side 
governance interventions focused on ser-
vice delivery areas are needed to ensure that 
money spent in social sectors translates into 
improved human outcomes. Well-skilled and 
healthy people can contribute to more rapid, 
sustained and inclusive growth in Africa, as 
well as enabling the poor to escape from 
poverty.
Strengthening value for money, 
accountability and voice
Problems of poor performance and low 
accountability may be overcome by strength-
ening the compact between policymakers 
and service providers (see figure 28.1) through 
mechanisms such as reporting require-
ments, performance criteria/benchmarks 
and sanction/incentive systems. Increasing 
client power relative to service providers by 
The Protection of Basic Services (PBS) program was 
established in June 2006 by the government of Ethi-
opia and international development partners. PBS 
supports Ethiopia’s progress toward the Millennium 
Development Goals. Its goal is to expand access to 
and improve the quality of decentralized basic ser-
vices in education, health, agriculture, water, sani-
tation and rural roads; strengthen local government 
systems by supporting financial transparency and 
accountability; and enhance social accountability to 
enable service users to influence policy and monitor 
service delivery.
The emphasis of PBS is on financial transparency 
and accountability; social accountability; and support 
of grievance redress mechanisms. The objective is to 
improve the quality of service delivery at woreda and 
kebele levels through an institutionalized system for 
transparency and accountability that is socially inclu-
sive and responsive to local needs. Supported by tar-
geted capacity building and systems strengthening, 
the three components are to contribute to the follow-
ing key outputs:
• Financial transparency and accountability: infor-
mation and communication activities with citi-
zens on expected service standards, budgets 
and budget use, and public education on budget 
processes.
• Social accountability: continuing assessments of 
service delivery and budget use by service users/
citizens, and development of joint action plans by 
service users and providers to improve services.
• Support of grievance redress mechanisms: 
strengthened opportunities for complaints and 
redress by citizens in cases of maladministration 
related to service delivery, and public education 
on existing opportunities.
Two subcomponents—public financial manage-
ment and citizen engagement—integrate aspects 
of the supply and demand sides of governance. 
Strengthening these linkages will improve local ac-
countability and transparency systems.
The expected outcomes of the project are that, 
by 2014: the percentage of citizens informed about 
the woreda budget will increase from 19% to 23%; 
the percentage of citizens who report that woreda of-
ficials have sought their views on improving the quality 
of basic services will increase from 48% to 50%; and 
an updated interim report on the social accountability 
component should demonstrate continued govern-
ment commitment to demand-side accountability.
Box 28.5 Promoting governance in Ethiopia—Protection of Basic Services program
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enhancing mechanisms for monitoring, evalu-
ation and grievance redress—for example, by 
including citizens on decisionmaking bodies 
or using CRCs and CSCs—can also lead to 
higher quality outcomes by strengthening 
provider incentives to serve the poor.
Community involvement in social audits 
can lead to increased transparency and 
accountability, better quality decisionmaking 
and more effective use of budget funds.38 
It can also act as a control on corruption 
through improving monitoring functions. 
Social audit experience has grown in Africa 
over the past decade, but its use remains 
far behind that of other regions. While Latin 
American and the Caribbean is considered at 
the forefront and numerous examples can be 
found in Asia, social audit remains relatively 
undeveloped in both North African and Sub- 
Saharan countries.39
Open and transparent information flows 
and feedback between the providers and 
users of services on topics such as the use 
of resources, the quantity and quality of ser-
vices and the attendance of teachers and 
health workers can support social account-
ability mechanisms. Increasing e-government 
practices in financial reporting, strengthen-
ing public monitoring through the Service 
Delivery Indicators and PETSs and promot-
ing participatory budgeting would not simply 
increase accountability and support voice 
within the service delivery system, but would 
also likely result in better value for money. 
Measures that promote greater access to and 
transparency of information—such as Free-
dom of Information Acts—support account-
ability mechanisms.
Initiatives that explicitly tie spending to 
outcomes, such as results-based financing or 
performance-based financing, can fast-track 
improvements in value for money. Perfor-
mance-based financing, a credible and inno-
vative funding alternative that ties the allo-
cation of resources to final system outputs, 
works as a service delivery system in which 
public service managers and staff work with 
communities to plan and produce the per-
formance they desire. Programs such as the 
Quality Education in Developing Countries 
initiative work to link education funding to 
results.40
Information and communications technol-
ogy (ICT) plays a strong role in securing better 
governance and service delivery. ICT has the 
potential to deliver more services for the same 
(or lower) cost and to deliver them to people 
that have had little or no access. Improved 
service delivery eliminates bottlenecks and, 
through e-government, minimizes personal 
contacts while enhancing transparency—
which helps reduce corruption and improve 
value for money. The information revolution 
gives Africa opportunities to leapfrog con-
ventional barriers to access in education and 
health at fairly modest cost. Technology can 
also reduce fiduciary risks and promote multi-
plier effects by involving the private sector as 
a partner. E-health is, for example, enabling 
African countries to develop vital registration 
and medical records, essential for improved 
management and delivery, while mobile tech-
nology can help transmit information rapidly, 
from medical alerts to remote diagnostics.
Capacity building and skills development
Capacity building is a key aspect of improved 
governance in service delivery. Training policy 
makers and service providers to better man-
age public resources and deliver public ser-
vices will in many cases result in improved 
social outcomes. The evidence provided in 
the previous section points to the need for 
skills development in data collection, analysis 
and use of critical information, as well as pro-
curement and allocation of equipment and 
commodities (for example, school books and 
medical products).
Capacity building and skills development 
is also required to overcome shortages in the 
supply of high-quality teachers and health 
workers (including pharmaceutical indus-
try workers). Dedicating resources to higher 
education—and more specifically teacher 
and medical training—is one way of address-
ing this gap.
Capacity and capability development is 
likely also necessary for activating citizens’ 
voice, to help ordinary people—and espe-
cially poor and marginalized groups—to better 
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understand their rights and to know how to 
access and process information. Community 
education programs, budget literacy courses 
and ICT training are some of the measures 
that can be implemented to achieve this goal.
More inclusive financial and social systems
Administrative, financial and political decen-
tralization of social service delivery is critical 
for fostering inclusive growth. Greater citizen 
participation in and control of service delivery 
can improve its quality and efficiency. Spe-
cific governance programs may be needed to 
bolster the voice of women in policymaking 
and service delivery. Women’s participation 
in policy processes that influence their chil-
dren’s education (such as parent–teacher 
associations) and health is crucial for break-
ing the cycle of intergenerational poverty.
Involving the private sector and house-
holds in delivering services can result in 
greater efficiency and effectiveness, leading 
to better human development outcomes. 
Including a greater number of partners in 
service delivery can also provide access to a 
wider range of expertise and resources than 
could be provided by government alone, thus 
overcoming inefficiencies in service provision 
from capacity, capability and resource con-
straints. Moreover, increased competition 
among service providers alters the incentive 
structures by widening consumer choice and 
allowing service users to “vote with their feet” 
and punish bad performance.41
Replacing central allocation of resources 
with citizen allocation—for example, by 
financing social services through conditional 
cash transfers rather than direct allocations to 
service providers—also boosts client power. 
Tightly targeted cash transfer programs are 
also more equitable, since funds are trans-
ferred directly to the poor, making it difficult 
for nonpoor groups to reap the greatest ben-
efits of social service provision.
Conclusions
The issue of governance is central to Afri-
ca’s development goals, particularly the 
continent’s focus on achieving sustained 
and inclusive economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Over time, there has been an 
ideological shift from “government” to “gov-
ernance”—that is, from viewing state actors 
as the sole and legitimate source of political 
authority in a country toward seeing the ben-
efits of more participatory and diffuse power-
sharing arrangements. The recent focus on 
“new public governance” highlights the view 
that the best way to ensure citizen welfare is 
to involve communities and service users in 
the design, implementation and evaluation of 
public service delivery.
In Africa today, social service delivery is 
characterized by insufficient decentralization, 
inadequate regulation, low value for money, 
weak capacity, poor management, uneven 
resource allocation, weak citizen voice and 
low transparency. While some African coun-
tries have implemented measures to tackle 
these issues, only a few have taken steps to 
strengthen the role of citizens in service deliv-
ery. It is only through empowering citizens 
to voice their demands and ensuring that 
the public sector and service providers can 
be held accountable for service delivery that 
good governance can be secured.
Some African governments have made 
headway in improving their social service gov-
ernance systems through use of instruments 
such as PETSs, staff absence surveys, CRCs 
and CSCs. However, Africa still has a long 
way to go in securing value for money, voice 
and accountability in social service delivery. 
Specific measures that have been shown to 
improve service performance include results-
based financing, e-governance, capacity 
building and tightly targeted cash transfer 
programs.
Administrative, financial and political 
decentralization combined with more plural-
istic power structures is now viewed as the 
route to optimizing human development out-
comes, and the new public governance para-
digm offers two main benefits and opportu-
nities. First, the different bases of authority 
depicted in table 28.1 are complementary, as 
each participant offers specific value added 
to the policy process: authority (the state), 
efficiency (the market) and effectiveness (civil 
society). And second, new public governance 
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may politically be a more saleable concept 
than its predecessor, new public manage-
ment: “Politicians prefer words such as ‘net-
work’ and ‘participation’ to words such as 
‘efficiency’ or ‘responsibility.’ This seems to 
be partly attributable to the nature of political 
communication.”42
While the approach here favors new pub-
lic governance and policy networks because 
citizens/clients are included in the service 
delivery process, there are potential risks 
and challenges that also need to be recog-
nized and addressed. First, policy networks, 
like any other decisionmaking forum, may be 
subject to capture by self-referential actors—
and may thus not serve the wider collective 
interest.43 Mechanisms need to be put in 
place to offset this risk. Innovative solutions 
must be introduced, especially in fragile or 
weak states—which, when they devolve 
power, leave space for capture by vested 
interests.44 This may explain why studies have 
found a link between fiscal decentralization 
and corruption.45 Second, nonstate actors in 
policy networks may seek to obstruct gov-
ernment introduction of unpalatable mea-
sures, such as budget cuts, and may be 
successful in blocking such measures, since 
government is simply another policy actor, 
rather than the strongest actor in the net-
work.46 Under such circumstances, service 
delivery may not result in value for money—
not because of the outcomes of policy but 
because of the inputs. Again, there is a need 
for offsetting measures, such as subjecting 
policy decisions to wider community consul-
tation. Third, new public governance tends to 
be more popular with center-left parties than 
with the political right, at least when viewed 
from a developed country perspective. This 
may limit the practical application of the new 
public governance model in specific African 
country contexts.
Notes
This document was prepared under the guidance and 
supervision of Agnes Soucat (Director, OSHD) and 
Mohamed Youssouf (Manager, OSHD1). The authors 
are grateful to the following colleagues for their valu-
able inputs and comments: Mouhamed Gueye, Adel 
Ben-Youssef, Mulle Chikoko, Nawsheen Elaheebocus, 
Laurence Lannes, Ezzedine Larbi and Justin Murara.
1. “Youth of Kazakhstan: Think Informally, Act Efficiently,” 
summary of ZhasCamp  2010 meeting in Almaty, 
on October 8–10, 2010 (http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEX
T/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:22737787 
~menuPK:258614~pagePK:2865106~piPK:2865128 
~theSitePK:258599,00.html). The youth claim that 
they quoted Gandhi, but there is no available evi-
dence that Gandhi ever said this.
2. Chandy and Gertz 2011, 4
3. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries 
on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
4. Rhodes 1996.
5. Pierre and Peters 2000; Rhodes 1996; Hodges, 
Wright and Keasey 1996; Santiso 2001.
6. Mehrotra 2006.
7. Pierre and Peters 2000.
8. Mehrotra 2006.
9. Lack of will to challenge authority generally arises 
from a sense of powerlessness or a lack of influ-
ence (or “voice”) in political processes. It is often 
a problem for poor, vulnerable and marginalized 
groups.
10. World Bank 2004.
11. Lee 2011.
12. Castro-Leal and others 2000. The statistic on health 
excludes South Africa, which has developed private 
sector medical care.
13. Taylor 2008.
14. The Kenya education PETS website states: “It is 
found that some schools are receiving more alloca-
tion than required and that funds are diverted for 
personal gains” (see http://pets.prognoz.com/prod/
CountryProfile.aspx?c=104&su=418).
15. Malen 2006.
16. Castro-Leal and others 1999.
17. Poverty Action Lab 2009.
18. Hagen-Zanker and McCord 2010. Six sectors are 
covered in this estimate: education, health, social 
protection, water and sanitation, agriculture and 
infrastructure. This reflects the fact that social 
service delivery is linked to wider service delivery 
issues. For example, energy, water and sanitation 
are directly related to health outcomes, while agri-
culture contributes to nutrition.
19. Albers and Peeters 2011.
20. WHO 2013; Curtis 2013. However, in absolute terms 
the level of resources allocated per capita is low 
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compared with other parts of the world (Malarcher, 
Olson and Hearst 2010).
21. Curtis 2013.
22. Nkosi 2012. Information on results can be found at 
http://timss.bc.edu/ or in individual reports at http://
timss.bc.edu/timss2011/downloads/T11_IR_M_
Chapter2.pdf.
23. Mills, Rasheed and Tollman 2006
24. Nyoni 2008. Other issues include international 
migration, career changes among health workers, 
premature retirement or mortality, morbidity and the 
challenges to education and health provision from 
Africa’s “youth bulge” (Kinfu and others 2009).
25. Naicker and others 2010.
26. Anyangwe and Mtonga 2007.
27. Oxfam GB 2012.
28. Castro-Leal and others 2000.
29. Castro-Leal and others 1999.
30. Jones and others 2009; Iqbal 2006.
31. Malen 2006.
32. Winkler 2005.
33. Gauthier 2006. In this case, PETS highlighted poor 
record management systems, which inhibited con-
trol of corruption.
34. Chaudhury and others 2006.
35. However, Uganda’s 2000 absenteeism rate should 
be treated with some care, since apparently health 
staff had prior warning of when the random spot 
check would be taking place.
36. Bradley and others 2008.
37. Details of this initiative can be found here: http://
info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/233097/
Reform%20Hospitaliere/htm/143_Domaines.htm.
38. Kay 2011.
39. World Bank Social Accountability Source-
book electronic resource (www.worldbank.org/
socialaccountability_sourcebook/).
40. For details, see www.hewlett.org/programs/global-
development-program/quality-education-in-devel-
oping-countries. The initiative focuses its support 
on Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and 
Uganda.
41. Tiebout 1956.
42. Fattore, Dubois and Lapenta 2012.
43. Pierre and Peters 2000.
44. For example, a comprehensive and well-targeted 
technical assistance program combined with sup-
port for building state capacity and accountability 
is essential in sustaining the recovery process of 
postconflict or transition countries, but may not 
be possible where a country is still experiencing 
active conflict or prolonged crisis. Very weak states 
require tailored programs according to their multiple 
reconstruction objectives (Brinkerhoff 2007).
45. Fisman and Gatti 2002.
46. Fattore, Dubois and Lapenta 2012.
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